In their seminal solution of the chain store paradox Kreps and Wilson assumed that the incumbent monopolist is predisposed, with a small probability, to ght e n try. Milgrom and Roberts suggested to view this predisposition to ght as a result of precommitment to an aggressive course of action. However, they did not examine whether such an ability to make commitments is actually chosen by a rational incumbent monopolist. The present paper lls this gap. We assume that the monopolist has access to an appropriate commitment mechanism, with a small probability. Due to the possibility of misunderstanding or communication error, commitments are not perfectly observable. Otherwise, the assumptions of Kreps and Wilson are maintained. These plausible modications have drastic implications: Precommitment b ecomes useless, and reputation eects break down; Selten's chain store paradox comes back in full force.
Introduction
This paper reconsiders the solution of the chain store paradox b y Kreps and Wilson (1982) . This solution assumed that the incumbent monopolist is predisposed, with a small probability, t o g h t e n try. Amazingly, this addition to the original chain store game was sucient to give rise to reputation eects that prevent e n try, except in the last stages of the game.
However, this explanation of reputation and entry deterrence begs the question: where does the assumed predisposition to ght come from? Milgrom and Roberts (1982) suggested an explanation of how such a predisposition to ght m a y emerge. Apart from the possibility of \irrational" play, they emphasized that the incumbent m a y h a v e e n tered precommitments that changed his payos appropriately:
\In the game actually being played, the established rm may be able to precommit itself to an aggressive course of action and may have done so." Milgrom and Roberts 1982, p. 303 Such precommitments might take the form of a build{up of capacity 1 or of contractual obligations. For example, the incumbent rm may be run by managers who operate on the basis of forcing contracts that gives them strong incentives to ght e n try. The uncertainty concerning the type of incumbent monopolist would then reect potential entrants' doubts about the kind of managerial contract or the possibility of contract renegotiations. 2 However, Milgrom and Roberts did not examine whether such an ability to make rm commitments is actually chosen by a rational incumbent monopolist.
The present paper attempts to ll this gap. We assume that the monopolist has access to an appropriate commitment mechanism, with a small probability. Due to the possibility of misunderstanding or communication error, commitments are not perfectly observable. Otherwise, the assumptions of Kreps and Wilson are maintained. We show that these plausible modications have drastic implications. In particular, precommitment b ecomes useless, and reputation eects break down. Selten's (1978) chain store paradox comes back in full force.
Our results complement a recent contribution by Bagwell (1995) who showed that in games of complete information the power of precommitment has no value if the commitment to a certain action is imperfectly observable. 3 Bagwell's result has the potential to launch a major attack on the use of stage games in economics, which h a v e been exceedingly popular in economics, particularly in industrial organization. However, caution is advised already because the problem might v anish in games of incomplete information. Our results indicate that Bagwell's criticism also applies to sequential games of incomplete information.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we state the game. The analysis begins, in Section 2, with the extreme case where the incumbent monopolist's commitment is unobservable (or completely uninformative). This analysis is then extended in Section 3 to allow for imperfect observability. The paper closes with a discussion of limitations and extensions.
The Game
Consider the chain store game by Kreps and Wilson (1982) . We modify it in two regards: the tough incumbent monopolist chooses a particular commitment, and entrants cannot perfectly observe that commitment.
Players The players are the incumbent monopolist m that serves a xed sequence of markets: N;N 1; : : :; 1, where N 2, and a set of potential entrants denoted by the market into which they may e n ter, n 2 f N;N 1; : : :; 1 g , in this sequence. (Like in Kreps and Wilson, time is indexed backwards; entrant n 1 succeeds n, and N is the rst and 1 the last market.)
The incumbent monopolist m is either \weak" (w) or \tough" (t). The only dierence between the two t ypes is that t makes an irreversible commitment to a complete sequence of actions at the outset of the game, whereas w optimizes in each market. The monopolist knows his type; entrants do not.
Actions/Strategies Entrants either \enter" (E) or \stay out" (O) of their respective market. The monopolist responds to entry with either \ght" (F ) or \accommodate" (A). The corresponding action sets are A n := fE;Og, n = N ; : : :; 1, and A m := fF;Ag. The entrants' and w 0 s strategies are reactions to the history of the game h, which is the sequence of past actions. In addition, the monopolist chooses a plan of action, as explained below. Stage 3 If entry has occurred, monopolist w responds with either F or A; mixed strategies are permitted. Monopolist t executes his plan of action, a t . I f n o e n try has occurred, the monopolist is not called upon to move. The monopolist's action is observed by all players.
Sequence of Moves
Stages 2{3 are repeated in each successive market, from N 1 t o 1 . P a y os Players' payos in each market n depend upon their moves in that market, as summarized in Fig. 1 . Notice in that table, without the entrant present the incumbent earns monopoly prots of c > 1, whereas with the entrant present he can either accommodate and split the market (earning 0 each) or respond aggressively and force losses upon entrants (b 1 < 0) at a cost ( 1). Therefore, ghting only pays if it deters entry in at least one subsequent market (due to c 1 > 0), and entry pays only if the monopolist accommodates with suciently high probability (due to b 1 < 0). For simplicity, discounting is ignored.
Beliefs At the outset of the game, potential entrants assess the monopolist to be tough with probability p 0 := Prftg which is common knowledge. This probability is suciently small so that entry is never deterred in a one{shot version of the game (p As is well known, the chain store game by Kreps and Wilson has an unique equilibrium only if one adopts certain equilibrium renements that eliminate certain \implausible" o{equilibrium beliefs. In this regard we follow Kreps and Assumption 2 Whenever an action is observed that deviates from t 0 s equilibrium plan a t , all subsequent entrants infer that they face w with certainty.
Finally note, if t is committed to ght e n try in every market, our game coincides with Kreps and Wilson (1982) . However, in equilibrium t may choose another commitment or no commitment at all. 4 3 Commitment without Observability
In this section we consider the extreme case in which e n trants do not observe the plan of action or, equivalently, that the signal is completely uninformative.
To understand the complexity of that game, suppose for the moment that it is played only once. Then the entrant is unsure whether he plays a simultaneous moves game | which is the case if he deals with t | o r a sequential moves game | which is the case if he faces the monopolist w that reacts to entry. The simultaneous moves game has two Nash equilibria: (O;F) and (E;A), whereas the sequential moves game has only one subgame perfect equilibrium: (E;A). Now add nitely many repetitions. Then, the simultaneous moves game has a plethora of subgame perfect equilibria 5 whereas the sequential moves game still has exactly one.
Entrants are unsure which game is actually played. Together with Assumptions 1 and 2 (which eliminate certain implausible beliefs), this uncertainty gives rise to an unique sequential equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Suppose t 0 s commitment is not observable. Then the chain store game has no sequential equilibrium where t ghts entry in some market.
Proof Suppose, per absurdum, that t 0 s equilibrium plan of action commits him to ght e n try in some market n 1. Let k be the last market where he is committed to ght. Then the equilibrium strategies must have the following additional properties that will be proved below: 1) In all markets n < k , e n try occurs with certainty regardless of entrants' beliefs concerning the monopolist's type. 2) In market k, the weak monopolist w accommodates entry with certainty. 3) Entrant k stays out with certainty, provided the monopolist had responded to entry according to t 0 s equilibrium plan in all preceding markets. 4) In all markets n > k , monopolist w mimics t and behaves exactly according to t 0 s equilibrium plan of action. Putting pieces together, one easily arrives at a contradiction: By 4) on the equilibrium path entrants do not update their prior beliefs concerning the monopolist's type until market k. Given these beliefs and the fact that w accommodates entry in market k by 2), it follows that k enters with certainty if in all preceding markets the monopolist responded to entry according to t 0 s equilibrium plan | which h o w ever contradicts property 3). We n o w prove properties 1) to 4). 1) Since t does not ght in markets n < k , monopolist w reveals his type if he ghts in any of these markets. Fighting entry pays only if entry is deterred in at least one subsequent market. Hence, by a standard backward induction argument, it follows that w accommodates entry in all markets n < k . Therefore, in all markets n < k , both w and t accommodate and entry occurs with certainty, regardless of beliefs.
2) Since entry occurs anyway in all markets n < k , w could only loose by ghting entry in market k. 3) Suppose k enters with positive probability, e v en though the monopolist had always behaved according to t 0 s equilibrium plan. Then, t would be better{ o with a dierent plan which prescribes accommodation in market k, since entry occurs anyway thereafter, by 1). This contradicts the assumption that the given plan is an equilibrium plan. 4) If monopolist w has mimicked t up to market k+2, then he will also mimic in market k + 1 because that prevents entry in market k, b y 3). Repeated application of this argument to market k + 3 etc. up to market N proves the assertion.
Proposition 1 (No Observability) Assume t 0 s commitment is not observable. Then, the chain store game has an unique sequential equilibrium outcome: entry occurs in all markets and is never fought.
Proof By Lemma 1 we know that in a sequential equilibrium t accommodates entry in all markets. Using a standard backward induction argument implies that w also accommodates entry in each market and that each entrant e n ters with certainty, regardless of beliefs concerning the monopolist's type. In turn, a commitment to \always accommodate" is t 0 s best reply to this strategy of entrants.
Commitment with Imperfect Observability
The above result also holds if commitment is imperfectly observable. In the following we formalize the notion of imperfect observability, i n troduce some assumptions concerning the signal quality, and then generalize Proposition 1.
The monopolist has chosen a plan of action a 2 A at the outset of the game. This plan is imperfectly observable in the sense that after a is chosen all players observe a signal s := (s N ; s N 1 ; : : :; s 1 )2 A , which is common knowledge. That signal conveys information concerning the monopolist's plan of action subject to some imperfection. It has the following properties:
Assumption 3 (Full Support) For each given action plan a i 2 A , players observe each conceivable plan with positive probability (the support of the probability distribution of s is independent of a i ): PrfS = s j a i g > 0; 8s 2 A ; 8 a i 2 A : Of course, only t is bound by his choice of actions. Therefore, s can only be indicative of the actions to be executed by t; the action plan of w is purely \cheap talk".
The signal s is not only indicative of the t 0 s actions but also of the monopolist's type. Entrants' assessment of the monopolist's type, evaluated after the signal is observed, depends upon s and the prior belief p 0 . Consistency of beliefs with the underlying equilibrium action plan (a w ; a t ) requires p N (s) : = P r f monopolist is type t j S = sg = p 0 Prfs j a t g p 0 Prfs j a t g + ( 1 p 0 ) P r f sja w g :
By the full support assumption this posterior probability is dened everywhere and p N (s) 2 (0; 1); 8s.
Similarly, dene entrants' beliefs concerning t 0 s plan of action (a; s) : = P r f monopolist t is committed to plan a j S = sg: Proof Suppose, in equilibrium t has made a commitment to the action plan a t . Due to the full support assumption, entrants observe each possible signal s 2 A with positive probability. Hence, is conrmed on the equilibrium path only if entrants apply probability 1 to the event that t has chosen a t for each possible signal. This proves (4.5).
Since the signal is costless, it is plausible that w will always mimic t with regard to his choice of \announced" plan of action.
Lemma 3 ( T ype Inference) Suppose t 0 s equilibrium action plan prescribes to ght entry in some market, and assume that the signal distortion is sufciently small. Then, w announces the same plan as t, and entrants' beliefs concerning the monopolist's type a r e independent of the observed signal, Suppose s = a t is observed. Then p N > b and w can prevent e n try in each market where t ghts simply by accommodating whenever t accomodates | without ever having to ght. Given t 0 s plan of action, this is the best that can possibly happen to w.
Suppose s = a w is observed. Then, p N < b , b y (4.8). Let k be the last market where t ghts. Then, by an argument similar to the reasoning in Lemma 1, w accommodates in market k, and k stays out only if his probability assessment of facing t has increased suciently so that p k b.
But such updating of beliefs can only have happened if entry occurred in some market to which w responded with a mixed strategy. (Otherwise, there is no updating of beliefs in the right direction, in which case p k p N < b and k enters with certainty.) Responding to entry with a mixed strategy entails the risk that w reveals his type in which case entry occurs with certainty i n all subsequent markets. Therefore, w 0 s payo is lower than in the case when s = a t is observed.
Since the signal is almost perfect (Assumption 4), w can gain by switching from a w to a t | which contradicts the assumption that a w is an equilibrium plan of action.
Proposition 2 (Imperfect Observability) Suppose t 0 s commitment is imperfectly observable in the sense of Assumptions 3{4. Then, the chain store game has an unique sequential equilibrium outcome: entry occurs in all markets and is never fought.
Proof It is obvious that a t = a w = ( A ; : : :; A ), a w n = A; 8n, e n = E;8n (for all histories) is a sequential equilibrium. In order to show that it is the only one, suppose t 0 s action plan prescribes ght in at least one market. By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 both w and t make the same announcement, and the observed signal of their announced action plan is completely ignored. Therefore, the game with imperfectly observable signals collapses to the game without observability, which w as already solved in Proposition 1.
Discussion
The present paper has reconsidered the solution of the chain store paradox b y Kreps and Wilson and Milgrom and Roberts. We i n troduced two plausible modications: First, rather than assuming that the tough monopolist is predisposed to ght all entrants we assumed that he has access to a commitment mechanism and rationally chooses among dierent commitments. Second, we assumed that the commitment to a certain plan of action is imperfectly observable, due to a small probability of misunderstanding or communication error. These modications were shown to completely erode the value of reputation mechanism and bring back Selten's chain store paradox in full force.
One limitation of our analysis is that we excluded the possibility of commitment t o a r andom plan of action. In his analysis of the role of observability in complete information commitment games Bagwell pointed out that his game has several equilibria if one allows for randomized commitments. One of these mixed strategy equilibria preserves the value of commitment (but not the other). A similar multiplicity issue may come up in our framework. However, since our pure strategy equilibrium is strict whereas mixed strategy equilibria are necessarily weak, common equilibrium renements are biased in favor of the equilibrium presented here. 6 
